The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will by Miller, Kenneth P.
Chapman Law Review
Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 6
2015
The California Supreme Court and the Popular
Will
Kenneth P. Miller
Claremont McKenna College
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth P. Miller, The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will, 19 Chap. L. Rev. 151 (2016).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol19/iss1/6
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:59 AM 
 
151 
The California Supreme Court and the 
Popular Will 
Kenneth P. Miller*  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past half century, California has been a 
battleground for conflicts over the nature, scope, and limits of 
rights. While Americans have always clashed over rights, the 
modern rights revolution has expanded the conflict throughout 
the country, and nowhere more than in California. These 
struggles have been hard fought, because rights have power. 
Once an interest is converted into a right, it can trump 
competing interests that lack the status of right. The ability to 
recognize, create, or limit rights is consequential, indeed.1  
California’s prominence in these conflicts can be traced to 
several factors. First, the state has deep ideological divides. 
California is home to progressive social movements that have 
sought to establish new rights in areas including abortion, 
capital punishment, criminal procedure, school funding, gay 
rights, aid-in-dying, and more—and home, as well, to highly 
motivated conservative groups that have resisted many of these 
changes. Second, California exists within a federal system that 
allows states to innovate in the area of rights. State 
constitutional rights operate semi-independently of the U.S. 
Constitution—that is, states may define state constitutional 
rights more expansively than the Federal Constitution requires. 
An assertive state supreme court, through state constitutional 
interpretation, can establish new rights. The California Supreme 
Court, more than any other state court, has expanded state 
constitutional rights beyond federal minimums.2 Third, citizens 
of California have extraordinary power to counter their state 
supreme court, through state constitutional amendment or 
 
 * Associate Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College. The author 
wishes to thank Harry Arnold, Jack Blattner, Zachariah Oquenda, and Victor Lopez for 
their research assistance. 
 1 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE 16 (1991); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of 
State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 892 (2001). 
 2 Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular 
Response, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 2061, 2065–67 (2013). 
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judicial election, when it issues decisions they oppose. 
California’s court-constraining powers are particularly robust 
because citizens have the ability to adopt state constitutional 
amendments directly through the initiative process.3  
A state with an ambitious, rights-creating court and an 
energized electorate that holds competing views and wields 
institutional counter-powers is poised for clashes over rights.4 In 
the 1970s, such conflicts emerged in California. A progressive 
majority on the California Supreme Court sought national 
leadership of a movement called “the new judicial federalism”—
an effort to expand rights at the state level—but faced the 
constraint of the state’s powerful system of majoritarian 
democracy.5  
This Article examines the efforts of the California Supreme 
Court to advance the rights revolution at the state level and 
the popular response to those decisions. This exchange between 
the court and the people now spans more than four decades, 
from the early 1970s through the relatively recent struggle over 
the definition of marriage. During this period, the California 
Supreme Court expanded a broad range of state constitutional 
rights, many of which remain intact today. Yet, the people 
countered the court when it expanded rights in ways 
that conflicted with their strongly held values. These 
controversies showed that, under California’s constitution, the 
people, not the courts, have the last word on the state definition 
of rights—so long, of course, as their decisions do not contravene 
federal law.  
The record indicates that Californians have exercised this 
power selectively, overturning some new state-level rights, but 
accepting many others. The system has imposed accountability 
on the court when it strays too far from the popular will, but also 
has conferred greater legitimacy on the expansion of rights above 
federal minimums when the people accept what they can, 
through a vote, reject. 
 
 
 3 On the use of court-constraining amendments in California and other states, see 
generally John Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State 
Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983 (2007).  
 4 See Reed, supra note 1, at 874–75. 
 5 For a discussion of the California Supreme Court’s early leadership of the new 
judicial federalism, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Peter J. Galie & John Kincaid, State High 
Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial 
Survey, 13 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 599, 603 (1986); and see Robert F. Williams, 
Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 211, 211–17 (2003). 
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I. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN  
CALIFORNIA, 1970–1986 
The movement known as the new judicial federalism 
emerged in the early 1970s as progressive lawyers and judges 
sought to extend the rights revolution in constitutional law 
following the denouement of the Warren Court.6 The strategy 
was straightforward: if Warren-era liberal justices were being 
replaced by more conservative Nixon nominees and the 
U.S. Supreme Court was moving to the Right, progressive state 
courts needed to assume greater responsibility for the rights 
revolution—that is, they needed to abandon their reliance on the 
Supreme Court to expand federal constitutional rights, and 
instead, start expanding rights at the state level through new, 
expansive interpretations of state constitutions. In this view, for 
example, as the U.S. Supreme Court chose to interpret the 
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment narrowly, in a 
way that favored law enforcement, a progressive state 
supreme court should chart an independent course by 
interpreting its state constitution’s comparable warrant 
requirements more expansively, in a way that favored criminal 
defendants.7 
The California Supreme Court was well positioned to pursue 
this goal. Through the leadership of the legendary justice Roger 
J. Traynor (1940–1970), the court had developed a reputation as 
the nation’s most innovative state court, and was especially 
influential in transforming American common law to align with 
the values of modern liberalism.8 Working under the shadow of 
the U.S. Supreme Court during the Warren era (1953–1969), the 
California Supreme Court, like its progressive counterparts in 
other states, had only rarely chosen to expand state 
constitutional rights. But as the Warren era came to a close, it 
was poised to move into that arena.  
 
 
 6 Reed, supra note 1, at 889. 
 7 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113–15 
(2009). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 8 See generally BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR (2003). During Traynor’s tenure, 
the California Supreme Court became the nation’s most influential state court, as 
measured by, among other factors, citations by other state courts. See, e.g., Gregory A. 
Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83 (1983); Jake Dear 
& Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 683 (2007); Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton 
Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1977).  
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A.  The Composition of the California Supreme Court, 1970–1986 
In 1970, the California Supreme Court was a progressive 
body consisting of six justices appointed by former two-term 
Democratic Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown—Chief Justice 
Traynor (Chief Justice 1964–1970) and Associate Justices 
Raymond E. Peters (1959–1973), Mathew O. Tobriner 
(1962−1982), Stanley Mosk (1964–2001), Louis H. Burke 
(1964−1974), and Raymond L. Sullivan (1966–1977).9 The court 
had one conservative holdover, Justice Marshall F. McComb 
(1956–1977), but was solidly liberal overall.10  
Brown’s successor as Governor, Ronald Reagan (1967–1975), 
believed the court was too liberal and wanted to nominate new, 
conservative justices who would exercise “judicial restraint.”11 
Reagan got his first opportunity to try to redirect the court in 
1970, when Chief Justice Traynor announced his retirement. 
Reagan turned to an appellate judge, Donald R. Wright, to fill the 
vacancy. Before his nomination, Wright was viewed as a reliable 
conservative. Soon after assuming the role of chief justice, 
however, Wright surprised Reagan and other conservatives by 
firmly aligning with the court’s progressive majority.12 Indeed, it 
was during Donald Wright’s tenure as chief justice (1970–1977), 
and with his full participation, that the court began aggressively 
expanding state constitutional rights. Governor Reagan’s other 
two nominees, William P. Clark, Jr. (1973–1981) (later Deputy 
Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, and Interior 
Secretary under President Reagan) and Frank K. Richardson 
(1974–1983), were solid conservatives, but generally unable to 
curb the court’s progressive majority. When Democrat Edmund 
G. “Jerry” Brown, Jr. succeeded Reagan in 1975, he gave the 
court a new infusion of liberal justices. During his first two terms 
as governor (1975–1983), Brown nominated seven progressives to 
the court—Wiley W. Manuel (1977–1981), Rose Elizabeth Bird 
(1977–1987), Frank C. Newman (1977–1982), Otto M. Kaus 
(1981–1985), Allen E. Broussard (1981–1991), Cruz Reynoso 
(1982–1987), and Joseph R. Grodin (1982–1987).13  
 
 9 Democratic Governor Culbert Olsen appointed Traynor to the court in 1940 as an 
associate justice; Governor Pat Brown elevated him to Chief in 1964. California Supreme 
Court Justices, CAL. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.cschs.org/history/california-supreme- 
court-justices/ [http://perma.cc/V6R6-QG2C].  
 10 Id. 
 11 LOU CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN: HIS RISE TO POWER 222–23 (2003).  
 12 JACQUELINE R. BRAITMAN & GERALD F. UELMEN, JUSTICE STANLEY MOSK: A LIFE 
AT THE CENTER OF CALIFORNIA POLITICS AND JUSTICE 150–51 (2013). 
 13 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9. 
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Only four Democrats served as Governor of California during 
the twentieth century, but three of them, Culbert Olson 
(1939−1943), Pat Brown (1959–1967), and Jerry Brown 
(1975−1983), had an outsized influence on the court, together 
nominating nineteen justices (including Traynor twice), nearly 
all of whom can be described as liberal or progressive.14 These 
appointments, combined with Republican governors’ 
inconsistency in nominating conservatives, made the California 
Supreme Court one of the nation’s most liberal courts from 
mid-century through 1986. In that year, as discussed further 
below, voters removed three liberal justices (Bird, Reynoso, and 
Grodin) through a judicial retention election, and Republican 
Governor George Deukmejian replaced them with conservatives, 
thereby shifting the court’s balance to the Right.15 
B.  The Court’s Expansion of Rights, 1970–1986 
Looking back, the span from 1970 to the election of 1986 
(that is, the Wright-Bird era) can be seen as the height of the 
new judicial federalism in California. During those years, the 
court actively expanded state constitutional rights in several 
areas of law, including: 
1. capital punishment 
2. criminal procedure  
3. equal protection (gender equality, sexual orientation 
equality in employment, equality in public school 
financing, desegregation of public schools, and racial 
non-discrimination in jury selection) 
4. abortion (basic right to abortion and right to publicly 
funded abortion) 
5. free speech (expansion of free speech and petition rights 
on private property) 
6. non-establishment of religion 
Table 1 sets forth these new state constitutional rights, and 
the court decisions establishing them, in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 14 Olson nominated three justices, Pat Brown nine, and Jerry Brown seven (during 
his first two terms from 1975–1983). These figures separately count both nominations of 
Traynor.  
 15 See infra Section III.D. 
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Table 1: New Court-Established California State  
Constitutional Rights, 1970–1986 
Category 
New State 
Constitutional Rights 
Cases Establishing Rights 
Criminal Justice 
(capital 
punishment) 
Right against execution / 
abolition of capital 
punishment 
People v. Anderson (1972)16 
 
Criminal Justice 
(procedure) 
Procedural rights of 
criminal defendants, 
including those related 
to admissions, 
confessions, searches, 
exclusionary rule,17 
vicarious exclusionary 
rule18  
People v. Krivda (1971)19 (searches); 
Mozetti v. Superior Court (1971)20 
(searches); People v. Superior Court 
(Hawkins) (1972)21 (blood tests); 
Burrows v. Superior Court (1974)22 
(warrants); People v. Longwill 
(1975)23 (searches); People v. 
Brisendine (1975)24 (searches); 
People v. Disbrow (1976)25 
(admissions); People v. Jimenez 
(1978)26 (confessions); People v. 
Pettingill (1978)27 (interrogations); 
In re Tony C. (1978)28 (stop and 
frisk); People v. Wheeler (1978)29 
(jury selection)  
Criminal Justice 
(procedure)  
Procedural rights of 
criminal defendants, 
including those related 
to reciprocal discovery; 
hearsay at preliminary 
hearing; post-indictment 
preliminary hearing 
Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 
(restrictions on prosecutorial 
discovery);30 Allen v. Superior Court 
(1976) (restrictions on prosecutorial 
discovery);31 In re Misener (1985)32 
(restrictions on prosecutorial 
discovery); Mills v. Superior Court 
(1986)33 (confrontation of accusers 
 
 16 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).  
 17 People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
 18 People v. Martin, 85 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955). 
 19 People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971).  
 20 Mozetti v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1971). 
 21 People v. Superior Court, 493 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1972). 
 22 Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974). 
 23 People v. Longwill, 538 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1975). 
 24 People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1975). 
 25 People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976). 
 26 People v. Jimenez, 580 P.2d 672 (Cal. 1978). 
 27 People v. Pettingill, 578 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1978). 
 28 In re Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978). 
 29 People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). 
 30 Reynolds v. Superior Court, 528 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1974). 
 31 Allen v. Superior Court, 557 P.2d 65 (1976). 
 32 In re Misener, 698 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1985). 
 33 Mills v. Superior Court, 728 P.2d 211 (Cal. 1986). 
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Category 
New State 
Constitutional Rights 
Cases Establishing Rights 
at preliminary hearing); Hawkins v. 
Superior Court (1978)34 (right to 
post-indictment preliminary 
hearing)  
Equal Protection 
(gender) 
 
Strict scrutiny for laws 
that classify on basis of 
gender  
Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971)35 
Equal Protection 
(race) 
 
Right to desegregation of 
public schools regardless 
of cause of segregation 
Crawford v. Board of Education of 
Los Angeles (1976),36 re-affirming 
dictum in Jackson v. Pasadena City 
School District (1963)37  
Equal Protection 
(sexual 
orientation) 
Right to non-
discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in 
employment 
Gay Law Students Association v. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
(1979)38 
Equal Protection 
(education) 
Right to equalized public 
school funding  
Serrano v. Priest II (1976)39 
Abortion Right to abortion People v. Belous (1969);40 
People v. Barksdale (1972)41 
Abortion Right to publicly funded 
abortion 
Committee to Defend Reproductive 
Rights v. Myers (1981)42 
Free speech Right to free speech on 
private property  
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center (1979)43 
Religion 
(non-establishment) 
 
Prohibition on religious 
displays on public 
property 
Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978)44 
Religion 
(non-establishment) 
 
Prohibition on state-
loaned textbooks to 
parochial schools 
California Teachers Association v. 
Riles (1981)45 
 
 34 Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978). 
 35 Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971). 
 36 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976). 
 37 Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963). 
 38 Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
 39 Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
 40 People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969). 
 41 People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1972). 
 42 Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981). 
 43 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979). 
 44 Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978). 
 45 California Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P. 2d 953 (Cal. 1981). 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:59 AM 
158 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:1 
C.  The Court’s Primary Focus: Criminal Justice 
As Table 1 indicates, during this period the California 
Supreme Court expanded state constitutional rights most 
actively in the area of criminal justice. This ordering is logical, 
considering that a large share of a state supreme court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence arises in criminal cases, and because 
the Burger Court was retreating from the Warren Court’s 
expansive interpretation of the rights of criminal defendants.46 
At the urging of Justice Stanley Mosk, the California Supreme 
Court made the deliberate choice to distance itself from U.S. 
Supreme Court’s definitions of the rights of defendants and start 
charting its own, independent, more progressive course.47 
1. Capital Punishment  
Perhaps the most influential case in establishing the new 
judicial federalism was People v. Anderson (1972),48 a state 
constitutional challenge to California’s death penalty. As state 
constitutional law scholar Robert F. Williams has noted, the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in the case stimulated “the 
initial recognition that state courts could evade decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court by relying on their own state 
constitutions.”49 At the time, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
granted review in Furman v. Georgia (1972)50 on the question of 
whether capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment. 
The California Supreme Court’s progressive majority distrusted 
the Burger Court on this question and accelerated proceedings in 
People v. Anderson.51 Before the U.S. Supreme Court could issue 
its decision in Furman, the California Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Wright, held that capital punishment 
violated the California Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or 
unusual punishments. By basing the Anderson ruling on 
independent state grounds rather than on the Federal 
Constitution, the court showed other state supreme courts how to 
establish new rights in a way that insulated the decision from 
federal court review.52 
 
 46 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 125 
(2009). Williams notes: “The field of criminal procedure has, in many ways, provided the 
driving force behind the NJF. It is in this area that state courts first realized they could 
reach results different from those reached by the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least consider 
doing so.” Id.; see also G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 178 (1998).  
 47 BRAITMAN & UELMEN, supra note 12, at 152–54. 
 48 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
 49 Williams, supra note 5, at 213. 
 50 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 51 RONALD M. GEORGE, CHIEF: THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 76–77 (2013). 
 52 WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 120; see also Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:59 AM 
2016] The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will 159 
2. Criminal Procedure  
From 1970 forward, the California Supreme Court’s criminal 
procedure rulings formed an expansive web of state-level 
protections greater than those offered by the Federal 
Constitution’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, as 
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This outpouring of new 
state constitutional rights related to admissions, confessions, 
searches, “stop-and-frisk,” jury selection, and other elements of 
criminal procedure shifted the balance of state constitutional 
interpretation in California markedly in favor of defendants at a 
time when the U.S. Supreme Court was shifting the federal 
constitutional balance in favor of police and prosecutors.53 
D.  Other Decisions: Advancing the Progressive Agenda of the 
1970s and 1980s 
Beyond criminal justice, the California Supreme Court’s 
rights-expanding decisions during this era spanned a range of 
topics. The rulings corresponded with the progressive agenda of 
the 1970s and 1980s in areas including: racial, gender, and 
sexual orientation equality; abortion rights; equalization of 
education; free speech; and secularization of the public square. 
Each case, by definition, involved the discovery of a gap between 
the rights provisions of California Constitution and the 
U.S. Constitution, as interpreted, respectively, by the state and 
federal supreme courts.54 
1. Racial Equality  
In the 1970s and 1980s, equal protection jurisprudence 
related to race became increasingly complex as the U.S. Supreme 
Court wrestled with the scope of remedies for racial inequality. 
During this period, the California Supreme Court expanded state 
constitutional rights beyond federal minimums in a highly 
controversial area: desegregation of public schools. 
In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court placed limits on 
court-ordered busing to achieve desegregation. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Court held in Milliken v. Bradley (1974) that if 
school districts had not imposed de jure segregation, that is, had 
not intentionally segregated students on the basis of race, the 
 
Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972). 
 53 For an overview of the expansion of state constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants during this era, see generally BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991).  
 54 Joseph R. Grodin, Liberty and Equality Under the California Constitution, 7 CAL. 
LEGAL HIST. 167, passim (2012).  
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Equal Protection Clause generally did not require such remedial 
measures.55 Several districts in California, including Los Angeles 
Unified School District, had significant racial imbalances 
between schools, but it was a contested question whether school 
officials had intentionally segregated schools on the basis of 
race.56 The California Supreme Court was unwilling to accept the 
limitations of the Milliken standard, and in Crawford v. Board of 
Education of Los Angeles (1976),57 the court invoked the state 
constitution’s equal protection guarantee to require 
desegregation regardless of the reasons for racial imbalances.58 
The decision paved the way for court-ordered busing in Los 
Angeles and elsewhere in the state.59 
The court again expanded equality principles beyond federal 
minimums when it held in People v. Wheeler (1978) that, during 
jury selection in criminal trials, attorneys could not “[use] 
preemptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole 
ground of group bias.”60 The preemptory challenge historically 
allows attorneys to excuse potential witnesses without any 
explanation, but could be abused to exclude potential jurors 
based solely on their race, ethnicity, religion, or other group 
 
 55 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 56 A 1970 L.A. Superior Court decision found that the L.A. Unified School District 
had established de jure segregation, but, later, the state court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that there was insufficient evidence for such a finding. See Crawford v. Bd. of 
Educ. of L.A., 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 57 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976). 
 58 Syliva Yau, School Board’s Affirmative Duty to Alleviate Segregation Regardless of 
Race, 65 CAL. L. REV. 319–29 (1977).  
 59 During this period, the California Supreme Court departed from progressive 
ideology on race in one important case, Bakke v. Regents of University of California, 553 
P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976). This famous case involved a constitutional challenge to the 
admissions policies at the University of California at Davis medical school. Under those 
policies, the medical school set aside 16 of its 100 seats each year for a separate “special 
admissions program” that admitted only racial minorities. In a decision authored by 
Justice Mosk, the court held that this quota program violated the Federal Constitution. 
Many on the left attacked the court, and especially, Justice Mosk, for the decision. Mosk 
decided to base the Bakke decision not on the California Constitution, but rather on the 
Federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. As a consequence, the constitutional 
limitation on affirmative action was subject to U.S. Supreme Court review. The high court 
granted certiorari in the case and agreed with the California Supreme Court’s judgment 
that the U.C. Davis medical school’s admissions quota system violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In a letter to Hans Linde, Mosk noted: “I calculatingly relied on federal 
constitutional grounds for my Bakke opinion. Some of us are hopeful the United States 
Supreme Court will grapple with the issue so improvidently avoided in De Funis. Had I 
employed state constitutional provisions, our brethren in Washington would have had 
good reason to avoid certiorari. They now must consider the inevitable certiorari 
application on its merits. This is a rare exception to our normal desire to hasten finality of 
litigation.” BRAITMAN & UELMEN, supra note 12, at 172. 
 60 People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). The court based its ruling on 
California Constitution article I, section 16, which guarantees the right to a trial by a jury 
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.  
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characteristics. In the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
addressing the problem, the California Supreme Court acted, 
establishing the right to challenge such bias in the jury selection 
process. Nearly a decade later, in Batson v. Kentucky (1986),61 the 
U.S. Supreme Court established a federal constitutional 
protection against this type of bias in jury selection, following the 
principles the California Supreme Court established in Wheeler.62 
2. Gender Equality  
The birth of the new judicial federalism corresponded with 
the rise of second wave feminism, an era of heightened activism 
in support of gender equality. Proponents of women’s rights used 
both political activism and legal mobilization to advance their 
goals. As proponents of a Federal Equal Rights Amendment 
struggled to win ratification, litigants attempted to persuade the 
U.S. Supreme Court to employ the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause to strike down laws that made 
distinctions on the basis of gender. The Court moved in that 
direction, but with some ambivalence. In Reed v. Reed (1971),63 
the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a 
law that discriminated against women in the administration of 
estates, but did so using rational basis analysis rather than 
heightened judicial scrutiny. Two years later, in Frontiero 
v. Richardson (1973),64 the Court struck down gender distinctions 
in benefits to military personnel, but fell one vote short of 
declaring gender a suspect classification subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny. Finally, in Craig v. Boren (1976),65 a case invalidating 
gender distinctions in the state’s drinking age, the Court decided 
to treat gender as a “semi-suspect” classification, subject to 
intermediate judicial scrutiny. The California Supreme Court 
moved further and faster. In 1971, in Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,66 
the court invalidated a state law banning women from serving as 
bartenders. The court declared that gender classifications should 
be treated as suspect and should be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny—that is, gender should be treated like race.67 The court 
based its Sail’er Inn decision on the equal protection provisions of 
 
 61 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 62 The U.S. Supreme Court based its Batson ruling on the Federal Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 89. 
 63 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 64 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 65 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 66 Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).  
 67 Through Sail’er Inn, the California Supreme Court became the nation’s first state 
supreme court to treat gender as a suspect classification. John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles 
L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
675, 690–91 (1971). 
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both the federal and state constitutions. When the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the strict scrutiny rule for gender classifications in 
Reed v. Reed, the Sail’er Inn doctrine remained a state 
constitutional principle—again demonstrating how state 
supreme courts can establish rights beyond federal constitutional 
minimums.  
3. Sexual Orientation Equality 
During this period, the gay rights movement was also 
gaining strength in California and in other parts of the country. 
Among other goals, the movement sought to protect gay and 
lesbian persons as a class from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, in the workplace and elsewhere. Well before the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Romer v. Evans 
(1996),68 interpreting the Federal Equal Protection Clause to 
protect gay and lesbian persons, the California Supreme Court 
established this principle under the California Constitution. In 
Gay Law Students v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1979), 
the court held that the equal protection provisions of California 
Constitution article I, section 7(a) prohibit public employers 
(in this case, a publicly regulated private utility company) from 
discriminating against persons based on their sexual 
orientation.69 Through this decision, the California Supreme 
Court again advanced the rights revolution into an area where 
other courts would later follow. 
4. Abortion  
Meanwhile, the movement for personal autonomy in matters 
of procreation generated another contested question of 
constitutional rights—that is, whether a woman has a 
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. In 1973, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued its sweeping decision in Roe v. Wade,70 but 
again it was trailing the California Supreme Court. In People 
v. Belous (1969),71 the California Supreme Court invalidated a 
statute that criminalized abortion except when “necessary to 
preserve the life” of the pregnant woman, on the grounds that the 
law was unconstitutionally vague—the nation’s first judicial 
decision declaring an abortion statute unconstitutional.72 In 
 
 68 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 69 Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
 70 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 71 People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969). 
 72 See id. at 203–08 (overturning the conviction of a physician prosecuted under the 
statute); see also S.B. 462, 1967–1968 Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1967) (before the Court 
issued its decision in Belous, the California Legislature adopted the Therapeutic Abortion 
Act of 1967, a statute that liberalized abortion policy in the state). 
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People v. Barksdale (1972),73 the California Supreme Court 
struck down under both the California and Federal Constitutions 
the next iteration of the state’s abortion law, which had allowed 
abortion only in cases where “there is a substantial risk that 
continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical 
or mental health of the mother,” or in cases of rape or incest—
again on the grounds that this criminal statute was 
unconstitutionally vague.74 The California Supreme Court’s 
constitutional analysis of abortion restrictions influenced courts 
in other states, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe.75   
In the post-Roe era, the California Supreme Court expanded 
abortion rights beyond where the U.S. Supreme Court was 
prepared to go. For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected a federal constitutional right to federally funded 
abortion in Harris v. McRae (1980),76 the California Supreme 
Court, in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers 
(1981),77 established a state constitutional right to state-funded 
abortion. And, as further discussed below, after the Supreme 
Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey (1992)78 allowed states to impose certain restrictions on 
abortion rights, including parental consent rules, the California 
Supreme Court determined that California’s parental consent 
rule violated the state constitution.79  
5. Educational Equality  
In the 1970s, a gap emerged between the California Supreme 
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether 
there is a constitutional right to equalized funding of public 
education. In Serrano v. Priest I (1971),80 the California Supreme 
Court held that the state’s school funding policies involved both a 
suspect classification—because tying school funding to the 
property values in a local school district created a classification 
based on wealth—and a fundamental interest, education. Based 
 
 73 People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 267 (Cal. 1972).  
 74 Id. at 260. 
 75 Arthur G. Scotland, The Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable Termination or 
Miscarriage of Justice?—Proposals for Legislative Response, 4 PAC. L.J. 821, 823–27 (1973).  
 76 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309–16 (1980). 
 77 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 806 (Cal. 1981). 
 78 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
 79 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 818–19 (Cal. 1997). California’s 
parental consent law was enacted in 1987 through Assembly Bill 2274, which became 
1987 Cal. Stat. 1237 (amending California Civil Code section 34.5 and adding California 
Health and Safety Code section 25958). The law was challenged immediately after its 
adoption and its enforcement was stayed pending the outcome of the litigation. It was 
never enforced. 
 80 Serrano v. Priest I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 1264–65 (Cal. 1971). 
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on these determinations, the court applied strict scrutiny to 
state’s system for school funding and invalidated the system.81 
When the U.S. Supreme Court addressed these same issues in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973),82 
however, it reached the opposite result, rejecting the view that 
wealth is a suspect classification and that education is a 
protected right under the Federal Constitution. The California 
Supreme Court was unwilling to accept that outcome. In Serrano 
v. Priest II (1976),83 the court invoked the state constitution 
alone, requiring equalization of public school funding.  
6. Free Speech  
In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979),84 the 
California Supreme Court expanded the constitutional protection 
of free speech to include speech and political solicitation activities 
in shopping centers, even when the property is privately owned. 
The decision expanded California’s free speech rights beyond 
federal constitutional standards, which protect speech against 
abridgement by government actors, not private entities. When 
the mall challenged the ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Court narrowly affirmed in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
(1980), noting that California has the “right to adopt in its own 
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those 
conferred by the Federal Constitution.”85 This is true so long as 
the state court’s ruling did not violate any provision of the 
Federal Constitution. Here, the Court held that the California 
rule requiring a private shopping mall to protect free speech on 
its property did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking. 
The California Supreme Court’s Pruneyard decision remains an 
anomaly in state constitutional jurisprudence, almost universally 
rejected by other states.86 Nevertheless, it again highlights how a 
state supreme court can establish new constitutional rights when 
the right is rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
 81 See id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court’s 
Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 
CAL. L. REV. 720 (1972) (explaining that the California Supreme Court was the nation’s 
first court to declare that a state’s education funding system violated the state and federal 
constitutions); Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The 
Aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 558 (1996). 
 82 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973). 
 83 See Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).  
 84 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 343 (Cal. 1979). For an analysis 
of the Pruneyard litigation, see Joseph R. Grodin, Freedom of Expression Under the 
California Constitution, 6 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 187, 198–207 (2011). 
 85 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
 86 Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1151–52 (2007).  
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7. Non-establishment of Religion  
In its Establishment Clause cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has allowed, under some conditions, limited government 
accommodation and even support of religion, including the 
display of religious objects on public property87 or the provision of 
textbooks or transportation to students in religious schools.88 The 
California Supreme Court has interpreted the California 
Constitution to require a stricter separation. Two examples are 
Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978),89 which prohibited religious 
displays on public property, and California Teachers Association 
v. Riles (1981),90 which prohibited loans of state textbooks to 
religious organizations. 
Through these and other cases, the California Supreme 
Court of the Wright-Bird era established a clear pattern of 
advancing a more progressive constitutional order in California. 
Some California Supreme Court decisions from this era helped 
catalyze the recognition of rights by the U.S. Supreme Court (for 
example, in Roe v. Wade91 and Batson v. Kentucky92) and other 
state supreme courts. But the Court’s innovations also invited 
controversy at home.  
II. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE WRIGHT-BIRD ERA 
The California Supreme Court does not operate in a vacuum, 
but, rather, in a complex checks-and-balances political system in 
which the people may override its decisions through 
constitutional amendment, and may remove justices from the 
court through retention elections or recall. In the period 
1970−1986, the California Supreme Court was a highly 
ambitious, progressive court operating in a state that had strong 
progressive elements, but also a broad and deep conservative 
streak. Accordingly, the court was vulnerable to popular 
opposition. During these years, the California electorate was 
ideologically more conservative than it is today and stood clearly 
to the right of the court on a number of issues. On several 
occasions, the court’s opponents were able to mobilize these more 
conservative elements of the electorate and use various 
 
 87 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 714 (1984) (allowing the presentation of 
the nativity scene as part of an annual Christmas display by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island).  
 88 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 252 (1968) (upholding a New York 
law providing for the lending of textbooks to students in private—including religious— 
schools).  
 89 Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 682 (Cal. 1978). 
 90 Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 963 (Cal. 1981). 
 91 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 92 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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democratic means to overturn and otherwise limit the court’s 
progressive agenda.  
A. The Electorate 
Although California is now one of the most liberal and solidly 
Democratic states in the nation, it has not always been so. In the 
early 1970s, as the California Supreme Court was launching the 
new judicial federalism, the California electorate was more 
conservative than it is today. In the late 1960s, in the wake of 
social unrest in the state, rising crime, and other factors, 
pollsters reported an increase in the percentage of California 
voters who identified as politically conservative.93 As late as the 
1990s, California remained a highly competitive battleground 
state in partisan elections as progressive and conservative 
ideologies vied for dominance. Voters roughly supported 
Democratic and Republican candidates equally , and often split 
tickets. Democrats generally controlled the Legislature, while 
Republicans more often won top-of-the-ticket races for Governor, 
U.S. Senator, and President of the United States.94 For example, 
between 1966 and 1998, Republicans won six gubernatorial 
elections—Ronald Reagan (1966, 1970); George Deukmejian 
(1982, 1986); and Pete Wilson (1990, 1994)—a string interrupted 
only by Democrat Jerry Brown’s two victories in 1974 and 1978. 
Even more remarkably, in the six presidential elections between 
1968 and 1988, California voters supported the Republican 
candidate for President each time—Richard Nixon (1968, 1972); 
Gerald Ford (1976); Ronald Reagan (1980, 1984); and George 
H.W. Bush (1988). Democrats were not able to break Republican 
dominance in securing California’s presidential electors until 
1992.95 This relatively conservative electorate was not 
necessarily inclined to embrace the state supreme court’s 
progressive agenda.  
B.  Mobilization 
Before the 1970s, voters had never overturned a rights 
decision of the California Supreme Court through constitutional 
 
 93 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL RELEASE #647: DRAMATIC UPSWING IN 
PROPORTION OF VOTERS WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS POLITICALLY CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 16, 
1969); MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL RELEASE #703: PART I: SELF-STYLED 
CONSERVATISM THE DOMINANT MOOD OF CALIFORNIA ELECTORATE TODAY (Jan. 19, 1971). 
 94 See, e.g., MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL RELEASE #1420: STATE EVENLY 
DIVIDED BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS (Feb. 1, 1988). 
 95 For a discussion of political change in California during this period, see Morris P. 
Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Is California Really a Blue State?, in THE NEW POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY OF CALIFORNIA 291–308 (Frédérick Douzet, Thad Kousser & Kenneth P. 
Miller eds., 2008). 
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amendment, nor come close to defeating justices through 
retention elections.96 Although the court had issued various 
controversial decisions during the Traynor era and before, 
opponents had never successfully persuaded the public to push 
back. In the 1970s, however, conservative elected officials (mostly 
Republicans, but also some Democrats), interest groups, and the 
Republican Party organization made a counter-discovery to the 
court’s experimentation with the new judicial federalism. Just as 
progressive justices were exploring the possibilities of expanding 
rights through new interpretations of the state constitution, 
opponents realized they could mobilize the state’s electorate to 
counter the court, at least on some issues.  
C.  Institutional Options 
The court’s critics had several ways to challenge its decisions 
and institutional power—legislative constitutional amendment, 
initiative constitutional amendment, and removal of justices, 
either by judicial retention election or recall. 
1. Legislative Constitutional Amendment  
The most common form of state constitutional amendment is 
the legislative constitutional amendment, or LCA. Under the 
LCA process, the legislature proposes an amendment and refers 
it to the people for ratification or rejection (the one exception is 
Delaware, which allows the Legislature to amend the state 
constitution without voter approval).97 Different states have 
different threshold requirements for legislative and popular 
approval of amendments. California requires a two-thirds vote of 
both houses of the Legislature to propose the amendment, and a 
simple majority popular vote for ratification.98 To succeed under 
these rules, a legislative amendment must enjoy broad support—
that is, a supermajority of the Legislature as well as concurrence 
by the electorate. 
2. Initiative Constitutional Amendment  
California is one of sixteen states (the others are Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, 
 
 96 See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 105 (1989). In 1968, critics of Chief Justice Traynor stirred 
some opposition to his retention, but the effort failed. Traynor had authored the court’s 
controversial decision in Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966), striking down 
Proposition 14 of 1964. That measure had restricted the state’s ability to enact fair 
housing legislation. Despite this controversy, Traynor won retention with 65% of the vote. Id. 
 97 John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2013, in 46 THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES 2014, at 12−13 tbl.1.2 (2014) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF THE STATES]. 
 98 CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4. 
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Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, and South Dakota) where citizens may invoke the 
initiative process to amend their state constitution directly, 
without involvement by the Legislature.99 As noted above, 
California has the nation’s most robust system for 
citizen-initiated constitutional amendment (ICA). The California 
initiative process gives citizens power to amend the constitution 
with little restraint. The main limitations on citizen-initiated 
amendments are that they must address only one subject and 
may only amend, rather than revise, the constitution.100 To 
qualify an amendment for the ballot, proponents must gather 
signatures equaling 8% of the vote in the last gubernatorial 
election (compared to only 5% for initiative statutes) in a 150-day 
period. Once the amendment qualifies for the ballot, it can be 
adopted by a simple majority vote on the question—without any 
involvement or limitation by the Legislature or the Governor. 
Between 1970 and 2015, Californians adopted twenty-nine 
initiative constitutional amendments, the most of any state 
during that period.101 As discussed below, several of the approved 
amendments reversed decisions by the California Supreme Court.  
3. Judicial Election  
California’s system for selection and retention of supreme 
court justices is unique among the states. As set forth in article 
VI of the California Constitution, the process gives the Governor 
broad discretion in nominating justices to fill vacancies on the 
court (that is, unlike the so-called “merit selection” system used 
in some states, the Governor is not limited to a pool of candidates 
selected by a commission); it then places two separate checks on 
the Governor’s choice.102 The first check is a confirmation vote by 
the three-member Commission on Judicial Appointments, 
consisting of the chief justice of the California Supreme Court, 
the senior presiding justice of the state’s courts of appeal, and the 
 
 99 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 97, at 14. In two additional states, 
Massachusetts and Mississippi, citizens can initiate constitutional amendments, but must 
first submit them to the Legislature, and, in Massachusetts, the Legislature has the 
power to block the initiative’s enactment. Id. 
 100 CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. For a discussion of the distinctions between 
constitutional revision and amendment in California, see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.2d 48 
(Cal. 2009), and Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, California 
Policy Seminar Brief 1991 (on file with author). 
 101 Map of Initiatives Passed in the USA as of 2013, MILLER-ROSE INITIATIVE 
DATABASE, http://initiatives.roseinstitute.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2016); see also California 
Ballot Measures, U.C. HASTINGS C.L., http://library.uchastings.edu/research/ballots/ (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2016); Initiatives by Title and Summary Year, CAL. SECRETARY ST. ALEX 
PADILLA, http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ballot-measures/pdf/initiatives-by-title-and-sum 
mary-year.pdf [http://perma.cc/QD6Q-96RZ ]. 
 102 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 97, at 241–42. 
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Attorney General. If confirmed by this body, the new justice 
takes a seat on the court and serves until the next gubernatorial 
election. At that point, the public exercises the second check, by 
deciding whether to confirm the new justice or remove her from 
the court. In this vote, only the name of the justice—no 
opponents—appear on the ballot and the voters cast a “yes” or 
“no” vote on the question of whether to retain that justice for the 
balance of the term. The court’s seven seats have staggered 
twelve-year terms. When a new justice fills a vacancy, she may 
serve the unexpired years remaining in the term. For example, if 
a vacancy occurs in the sixth year of a term, the new justice may 
serve for the remaining six years. At the expiration of the term, a 
justice seeking to remain on the court must face the voters again 
in a retention election. The election is again an up-or-down vote 
and the justice faces no competing candidates. Instead, the voters 
decide whether to retain the justice or remove the justice and 
create a new vacancy to be filled through the normal process of 
nomination by the Governor and confirmation by the commission 
and voters. If retained, the justice is authorized to serve an 
additional twelve years.103 
4. Judicial Recall  
The California Constitution allows citizens to circulate 
petitions demanding the recall of public officials, including 
judges, prior to the expiration of their normal terms.104 To force a 
recall election, proponents must obtain within 160 days 
signatures equaling 12% of the vote for the office in the last 
election.105 Citizens have never qualified a recall petition against 
a member of the California Supreme Court, but the device 
provides an additional popular check on the court.106 Through 
judicial election and recall, the people have periodic opportunities 
to remove justices who stray too far from the public will. 
III. POPULAR PUSH-BACK AGAINST THE WRIGHT AND BIRD COURTS 
The combination of several elements—an activist, progressive 
court; an electorate that was more conservative than the court on 
some issues; political actors who could mobilize voters to 
challenge the court and institutional tools that allowed the 
people to do so—defined the relationship between the court and 
 
 103 CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 16. 
 104 Id. art. II; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11001, 11006 (West 2015). 
 105 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b); ELEC. § 11221(c). 
 106 Recall petitions have been circulated against several members of the court, but 
none have qualified for the ballot. See Complete List of Recall Attempts, CAL. SECRETARY 
ST. ALEX PADILLA, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/recalls/complete-list-recall-attempts/ 
[http://perma.cc/FXD2-R2RC]. 
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the people throughout the Wright-Bird era. Table 2 summarizes 
some of that conflict, listing, by category, leading cases 
establishing new rights and state constitutional amendments 
designed to override some of those decisions.  
Table 2: New Court-Established California State Constitutional Rights, 
1970–1986, and Overriding Amendments 
Category 
New State 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Cases 
Establishing 
Rights 
Overriding 
Amendments 
Vote 
Criminal 
Justice 
(capital  
punishment) 
 
Right against 
execution / 
abolition of 
capital 
punishment 
People v. Anderson 
(1972) 
Prop. 17 
(1972) 
Pass  
(67.5%)107 
Criminal 
Justice 
(procedure) 
Procedural 
rights of 
criminal 
defendants, 
including those 
related to 
admissions, 
confessions, 
searches, 
exclusionary 
rule,108 
vicarious 
exclusionary 
rule109 
People v. Krivda 
(1971) (searches); 
People v. Superior 
Court (Hawkins) 
(1972) (blood tests); 
People v. Longwill 
(1975) (searches);  
People v. Brisendine 
(1975) (searches); 
People v. Disbrow 
(1976) (admissions); 
People v. Jimenez 
(1978) (confessions); 
People v. Pettingill 
(1978) 
(interrogations) 
Prop. 8 
(1982) 
 
Pass 
(56.4%)110 
Criminal 
Justice  
(procedure) 
Procedural 
rights of 
criminal 
defendants, 
those related to 
reciprocal 
discovery; 
hearsay at 
preliminary 
hearing; post-
indictment 
preliminary 
hearing 
Reynolds v. 
Superior Court 
(1974) (restrictions 
on prosecutorial 
discovery); Allen v. 
Superior Court 
(1976) (restrictions 
on prosecutorial 
discovery); In re 
Misener (1985) 
(restrictions on 
prosecutorial 
discovery); Mills v. 
Superior Court 
(confrontation of 
accusers at 
preliminary 
hearing); Hawkins 
Prop. 115 
(1990) 
 
Pass 
(57.03%)111 
 
 107 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL 
ELECTION NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 30 (1972). 
 108 People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
 109 People v. Martin, 85 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955). 
 110 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION 
JUNE 8, 1982, at 45 (1982). 
 111 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 5, 1990, at 51 
(1990). 
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Category 
New State 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Cases 
Establishing 
Rights 
Overriding 
Amendments 
Vote 
v. Superior Court 
(1978) (right to 
post-indictment 
preliminary 
hearing)  
Equal 
Protection 
(gender) 
 
Strict scrutiny 
for laws that 
classify on basis 
of gender  
Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. 
Kirby (1971) 
No — 
Equal 
Protection 
(race) 
 
Right to 
desegregation of 
public schools 
regardless of 
cause of 
segregation 
Crawford v. Board 
of Education of Los 
Angeles (1976) 
Prop. 1 
(1979) 
(LCA) 
Pass 
(68.6%)112 
Equal 
Protection 
(race) 
 
Right against 
racial 
discrimination 
in jury selection 
(peremptory 
challenges) 
People v. Wheeler 
(1978)  
No — 
Equal 
Protection 
(sexual 
orientation) 
Right to non-
discrimination 
based on sexual 
orientation in 
employment 
Gay Law Students 
Association v. 
Pacific Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. 
(1979) 
No — 
Equal 
Protection 
(education) 
Right to 
equalized public 
school funding  
Serrano v. Priest II 
(1976)  
No — 
Abortion Right to 
abortion 
People v. Belous 
(1969); 
People v. Barksdale 
(1972) 
No — 
Abortion Right to 
publicly funded 
abortion 
Committee to 
Defend 
Reproductive Rights 
v. Myers (1981) 
No — 
Free speech Right to free 
speech on 
private property  
Robins v. 
Pruneyard 
Shopping Center 
(1979) 
No — 
Religion 
(non-
establishment) 
Prohibition on 
religious 
displays on 
public property 
Fox v. City of Los 
Angeles (1978) 
No — 
Religion 
(non-
establishment) 
Prohibition on 
state-loaned 
textbooks to 
parochial 
schools 
California Teachers 
Association v. Riles 
(1981) 
No — 
 
 112 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: SPECIAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 6, 1979 (1979). 
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A.  Crime 
The biggest divide between the court and the people of 
California during the Wright-Bird era was in the area of criminal 
justice—in particular, capital punishment and criminal 
procedure. As the court focused on expanding the rights of 
criminal defendants, the public was much more concerned with 
controlling crime and protecting the rights of crime victims. 
Polling data from the era demonstrates the public’s intense 
concern about crime policy and its frustration with the court’s 
perceived leniency. 
1. Capital Punishment  
At the end of the 1960s, some legal scholars, activists, 
lawyers, and judges started developing the theory that capital 
punishment was per se cruel and unusual punishment, and 
therefore, could be abolished by courts.113 Before that time, the 
issue was considered a political question for the people and their 
representatives to decide. Pollsters regularly surveyed public 
attitudes on capital punishment. In California, a significant 
minority of voters favored “doing away with” the death penalty, 
but was consistently outnumbered by those who wanted to 
preserve the ultimate sanction. In the fifteen years leading up to 
People v. Anderson (1972),114 the Field Poll surveyed the question 
seven times. Table 3 summarizes those results, as well as the 
results of a survey taken after the Anderson decision. 
Table 3: Public Opinion on Capital Punishment in  
California, 1956–1972115 
Year Keep Capital Punishment Do Away With It No Opinion 
1956 49 % 29 % 22 % 
1960 55 % 35 % 10 % 
1963 56 % 28 % 16 % 
1965 51 % 39 % 10 % 
1966 54 % 30 % 16 % 
1969 65 % 26 % 9 % 
1971 58 % 34 % 8 % 
Feb. 1972   People v. Anderson 
Sept. 1972 66 % 24 % 10 % 
 
 113 An influential article advocating judicial invalidation of capital punishment was 
Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970). 
 114 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
 115  MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #726: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR 
THE DEATH PENALTY REMAINS AT A RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL (Sept. 14, 1971) [hereinafter 
RELEASE #726]; MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #761: OVERWHELMING 
SUPPORT FOR DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA (Sept. 7, 1972) [hereinafter RELEASE #761]. 
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In reporting the results of the 1971 poll, Field noted that 
“[s]ome legislators have suggested that this issue be presented to 
voters on the 1972 ballot, but if a public vote were being held 
now, there is little question that a substantial majority of 
California voters would favor keeping the death penalty.”116 
When in February 1972 the California Supreme Court issued 
its decision in Anderson declaring that capital punishment per se 
violated the California Constitution, it was effectively testing 
that assumption. The state’s system of initiative constitutional 
amendment made it comparatively easy for opponents of the 
decision to put the question to voters: should the state 
constitution be amended to overturn Anderson? Law enforcement 
groups (including district attorneys, police, and sheriffs) and 
then-State Senator George Deukmejian mobilized and quickly 
qualified an initiative constitutional amendment for the 
November 1972 ballot. The amendment stated that the death 
penalty provided for under state statutes “shall not be deemed 
to   be, or to constitute, infliction of cruel or unusual 
punishments . . . nor shall such punishment for such offenses be 
deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution.”117 
A survey taken in September 1972, during the early stages of the 
public debate on the amendment, indicated that public support 
for capital punishment had increased after the court’s decision in 
Anderson, from 58% in September 1971 to 66% in September 
1972, rising to the highest level recorded by the Field Poll since it 
began surveying the issue in 1956.118 On Election Day, voters 
approved the amendment by a decisive 67.5–32.5% margin, thus 
overriding the court and restoring the validity of capital 
punishment under the California Constitution.119  
2. Criminal Procedure  
The California Supreme Court’s early advancement of the 
new judicial federalism featured many decisions expanding 
procedural rights of criminal defendants. The court’s agenda 
aligned with progressive ideas about reforming the criminal 
justice system, but conflicted with the broader public’s concerns 
about crime and public safety. Polling data again exposed this 
gap. In a 1973 poll, respondents listed crime and fear of crime as 
 
 116 RELEASE #726, supra note 115, at 2.  
 117 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
CONSTITUTION, PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED LAWS TOGETHER WITH 
ARGUMENTS: GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 42 (1972).  
 118 RELEASE #761, supra note 115; see also MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, 
RELEASE #766: RESTORATION OF DEATH PENALTY FAVORED BY VOTERS (Oct. 24, 1972).  
 119 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., supra note 107, at 30. 
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the most important problem facing the state, and one respondent 
in three claimed to have been a victim of crime in the past 
year.120 Deep concern about crime persisted from the 1970s 
through the mid-1990s. In a 1984 survey, for example, 
respondents ranked crime as their greatest concern—with 73% 
“extremely concerned” and an additional 23% “somewhat 
concerned.”121 
In light of these sentiments, the public became increasingly 
frustrated by the court’s focus on restricting the powers of law 
enforcement and expanding the state constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants. The law enforcement community saw an 
opportunity. It organized an effort to qualify an initiative 
constitutional amendment that would, in one stroke, overturn 
existing, pro-defense rulings and constrain future decisions of 
this type. In 1982, this coalition qualified for the ballot a 
combined initiative constitutional amendment and initiative 
statute called the Victims’ Bill of Rights. The measure, which 
appeared on the ballot as Proposition 8 of 1982, made sweeping 
changes to the state’s criminal justice system to limit the state 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants, increase the rights 
of crime victims, and enhance the powers of police and 
prosecutors. It embedded in the state constitution the right to 
restitution, restrictions on bail, limitations on plea bargaining, 
the right of crime victims to be heard at sentencing, enhanced 
punishment for recidivist offenders, restrictions on sentencing to 
the Youth Authority, as well as fundamental changes to the rules 
of evidence in criminal proceedings.122  
Perhaps most consequentially, its “truth in evidence” 
provision abolished the state’s exclusionary rule, which excluded 
the admission at trial of otherwise relevant evidence that the 
state obtained through violation of the defendant’s rights.123 The 
California Supreme Court had established the state’s 
exclusionary rule in 1955 (before the U.S. Supreme Court 
required states to comply with a federal exclusionary rule in 
Mapp v. Ohio) and had expanded it over time to apply more 
 
 120 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #779: CRIME AND FEAR OF 
CRIME NUMBER ONE COMMUNITY PROBLEM IN CALIFORNIA (Mar. 22, 1973); MERVIN D. 
FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #780: ONE IN THREE CALIFORNIANS CLAIM TO 
HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED BY CRIME DURING PAST YEAR (Mar. 23, 1973).  
 121 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1236: HIGH DEGREE OF 
PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT TWO STATE ISSUES: CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT; SCHOOLS 
AND EDUCATION 1 (Feb. 23, 1984).  
 122 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: PRIMARY 
ELECTION JUNE 8, 1982, at 32–33, 56 (1982).  
 123 Id. at 33. 
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broadly than the federal rule.124 The Victims’ Bill of Rights 
initiative overturned that rule and instead provided that, under 
state law, all relevant evidence would now be admissible at trial, 
with exceptions for statutory rules of evidence such as hearsay 
and privilege. California courts would now enforce only the 
federal exclusionary rule, and would not be permitted to exclude 
evidence more broadly under a separate, independent state 
rule.125 
George Deukmejian, now California Attorney General, 
summarized the proponents’ arguments in the official California 
ballot pamphlet:  
   Crime has increased to an absolutely intolerable level. 
   While criminals murder, rape, rob and steal, victims must install 
new locks, bolts, bars and alarm systems in their homes and 
businesses. Many buy tear gas and guns for self protection. FREE 
PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO LIVE IN FEAR. 
   Yet, higher courts in this state have created rights for the criminally 
accused and placed more restrictions on law enforcement officers. This 
proposition will overcome some of the adverse decisions by our higher 
courts.126 
Voters approved the measure by a 56.4–46.6% margin. 
The measure was challenged in court shortly after the 
election, and a closely divided California Supreme Court upheld 
it. Justice Mosk dissented, lamenting: “The Goddess of Justice is 
wearing a black arm-band today, as she weeps for the 
Constitution of California.”127 The Victims’ Bill of Rights 
initiative was a devastating blow for Mosk, an architect of the 
new judicial federalism, because it wiped away a large body of 
case law expanding state constitutional rights in the area of 
criminal procedure, and restricted the court’s ability to innovate 
in this area in the future.128  
Eight years later, as crime rates remained high and public 
concerns about crime persisted, the law enforcement community 
drafted another initiative constitutional amendment to protect 
 
 124 See generally People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). As an example of its 
expansive nature, the California exclusionary rule applied vicariously, that is, it granted 
the defendant standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of a 
third person’s constitutional rights. See People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (Cal. 1955). 
For the U.S. Supreme Court ruling applying the exclusionary rule to the states, see Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 125 J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victims’ Bill of Rights: Where Did It Come 
from and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. L.J. 843, 867–68 (1992). 
 126 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 122, at 34.  
 127 Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 313 (Cal. 1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 128 JACQUELINE R. BRAITMAN & GERALD F. UELMEN, JUSTICE STANLEY MOSK 155–57 
(2013). 
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crime victims and limit the procedural rights of criminal 
defendants. This measure, known as the Crime Victims Justice 
Reform Act, was designated as Proposition 115 on the state 
ballot. Among other provisions, the measure sought to eliminate 
or limit the procedural rights of criminal defendants, including 
the defendant’s right against prosecutor’s pretrial discovery, the 
defendant’s right to exclude hearsay at preliminary hearings, 
and the defendant’s right to post-indictment preliminary 
hearings. These provisions, again, would overturn rights 
established by the California Supreme Court. Moreover, and 
more radically, Proposition 115 sought to establish a “lock-step” 
provision that would bar the California Supreme Court from 
interpreting the California Constitution to recognize state 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants beyond the 
requirements of the U.S. Constitution—a direct and total 
repudiation of the court’s new judicial federalism jurisprudence 
in the area of criminal procedure.129 Voters embraced Proposition 
115 by a 57–43% margin.130 As discussed further below, the 
California Supreme Court upheld most of Proposition 115’s 
provisions but invalidated its sweeping lock-step rule.131 
B.  Busing  
The California Supreme Court’s decision to expand the 
constitutional basis for desegregative busing again conflicted 
with deeply held public views. By declaring that California’s 
constitutional standard for desegregation would be more 
stringent than the federal standard (that is, that remedies would 
be required regardless of whether the segregation was 
 
 129 California Constitution article I, section 24, reads as follows: “Rights guaranteed 
by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.” Proposition 115 sought to add the following amendment:  
   In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to 
due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with 
counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to 
confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against 
himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and 
to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed 
by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the 
United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford 
greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution 
of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors 
in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the 
Constitution of the United States.  
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: PRIMARY 
ELECTION JUNE 5, 1990, at 33 (1990).  
 130 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 111, at 51.  
 131 Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990); see also infra notes 176, 
178. 
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intentional), the court increased the prospects that many 
students in the state would be bused in pursuit of racial 
desegregation.132 
Public opinion surveys indicated that California voters 
overwhelmingly opposed the busing of public school students to 
achieve racial balance. In a June 1979 Field poll, 79% of 
respondents said that they were opposed to busing, compared to 
only 14% who supported it.133 A September 1979 Field Poll 
further underscored the state’s overwhelming opposition to 
busing. Field noted:  
   The public itself is quite clear about where it stands on the basic 
idea of school busing to achieve racial balance. There is a four to one 
majority against the idea, and very few people are neutral or 
undecided.  
   Opposition to busing pervades all areas of the state, all political 
partisanship groups, all levels of education, and is not affected by 
whether any family members are in the schools or their propensity to 
vote.134  
Both white and Hispanic voters heavily opposed busing, while 
black voters were evenly divided on the remedy.135 
Opposition to court-ordered busing was especially intense in 
the suburban areas of the sprawling Los Angeles Unified School 
District. Legislators representing that area, including Democrat 
Alan Robbins, led a bipartisan effort to place a constitutional 
amendment on the ballot to overturn the court’s decision.136 The 
amendment, which became Proposition 1 of 1979, proposed a 
lengthy amendment to the state constitution’s due process and 
equal protection clauses (article I, section 7(a)), to limit their 
independent force in the area of desegregation.137 The amended 
clauses would read as follows:  
   A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that 
 
 132  See Crawford v. Board of Education of L.A., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976), which 
affirmed the court’s principles for school desegregation set forth in dicta in  
Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963). For discussion of the 
Crawford context, see PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD 
AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 34 (1981). 
 133 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1031: CALIFORNIANS 
OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO SCHOOL BUSING (June 14, 1979).  
 134 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1043: LARGE MAJORITY 
OPPOSES SCHOOL BUSING, BUT MOST OF PUBLIC EITHER UNAWARE OF PROP. 1 (ROBBINS 
AMENDMENT) OR HAVE CONFLICTING VIEWS AS TO ITS EFFECTS 1 (Sept. 21, 1979). 
 135 Id. 
 136 STOLZ, supra note 132, at 33–37. 
 137 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: SPECIAL 
STATEWIDE ELECTION NOVEMBER 6, 1979, at 6–7 (1979). 
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nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes 
upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any 
obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or 
pupil transportation. In enforcing this subdivision or any other 
provision of this Constitution, no court of this State may impose upon 
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any 
obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific 
violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under 
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon 
such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.138 
The Legislature placed the amendment on the ballot through 
a bipartisan, supermajority vote of 62–17 in the Assembly and 
28–6 in the Senate.139 Voters approved the measure by a 
68.6−31.4% margin.140  
Progressive opponents of the amendment challenged it on 
federal constitutional grounds. In Crawford v. Board of 
Education of L.A. (1982),141 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
people’s decision to override the state supreme court. Justice 
Lewis Powell wrote: 
   We . . . reject[] the contention that once a State chooses to do “more” 
than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. We 
reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive 
of a State’s democratic processes and of its ability to experiment. This 
interpretation has no support in the decisions of this Court. . . . 
   In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal 
Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard 
prevailing generally throughout the United States.142 
C.  Other Rights—No Direct Challenges to the Court’s Rulings 
As noted above, during the early years of the new judicial 
federalism, the California Supreme Court expanded rights 
beyond federal minimums in a range of other areas, including 
abortion, gender equality, sexual orientation equality, equalized 
education funding, free speech, and non-establishment of 
religion. Polling information is not available for all of these 
 
 138 Id. at 7. 
 139 Id. at 6. 
 140 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 112. 
 141 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 535, 542 (1982). 
 142 Id. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:59 AM 
2016] The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will 179 
issues, but the existing data suggest that decisions generally 
aligned with public opinion; at the very least, the court’s 
decisions in these cases did not run counter to broad, strongly 
held opinion. 
Polling was most extensive on the question of abortion. 
During the period that the California Supreme Court led the 
nation in expanding abortion rights, through People v. Belous 
(1969)143 and People v. Barksdale (1972),144 polls indicated that 
Californians broadly supported liberalizing abortion laws. A May 
1967 Field Poll found that 73% of respondents favored changes to 
the state’s long-standing abortion law which allowed abortions 
only when the pregnant woman’s life was at risk.145 The court’s 
1969 ruling in Belous declared that law unconstitutional. After 
the Legislature adopted the Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967, 
which allowed abortion where the pregnancy could impair the 
physical or mental health of the mother or where the pregnancy 
was the result of rape or incest, polls indicated that the public 
favored even further liberalization.146 A majority of respondents 
would allow abortion “if [the] baby might have a serious 
deformity,” but did not fully support abortion on demand.147 The 
California electorate was thus substantially pro-choice on 
abortion prior to Roe v. Wade, during the time that the California 
Supreme Court was establishing a constitutional basis for the 
pro-choice position.  
Later, the abortion controversy turned to public funding for 
abortion, and in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights 
v. Myers (1981),148 the California Supreme Court declared that 
the state constitution’s protection of abortion rights included the 
right to public funding for abortion. This outcome was opposite of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris v. McRae (1980), 
which rejected a claim to a federal constitutional right to public 
funding for abortion.149 Shortly after the McRae decision, and a 
year before Myers, a poll indicated that Californians continued to 
support abortion rights generally, and were evenly divided on the 
question of whether the state should keep funding abortions 
 
 143 See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 204–06 (Cal. 1969). 
 144 See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1972). 
 145 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #556: LIBERALIZING ABORTION 
LAWS IS FAVORED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF CALIFORNIA VOTERS 1–2 (May 9, 
1967). 
 146 S.B. 462, 1967–1968 Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1967). 
 147 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #633: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
FAVORS SLIGHT LIBERALIZATION OF ABORTION LAWS, BUT NO MORE 2 (May 20, 1969).  
 148 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981). 
 149 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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(48% yes, 48% no, with 4% undecided).150 Opponents of Myers did 
not organize an effort to overturn it through a state 
constitutional amendment. 
While the Field Poll did not track California public opinion 
on gender equality at the time of the Sail’er Inn decision 
(1971),151 the Legislature voted to ratify the Federal Equal Rights 
Amendment in November 1972, shortly after it was referred to 
the states, and in 1980, nearly two-thirds of respondents (64%) 
favored the amendment.152 The Sail’er Inn decision faced no 
organized override effort. Similarly, by the time of the court’s 
decision in Gay Law Students (1979),153 public opinion in 
California had moved in favor of non-discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation in the workplace. In 1978 California voters 
soundly rejected a ballot measure that would have restricted 
employment of gays and lesbians in the public schools, and did 
not mobilize opposition to the court’s Gay Law Students ruling 
the following year.154 
The public also accepted the court’s decisions to expand 
rights beyond federal minimums in areas including free speech 
on private property, non-establishment of religion, and 
equalization of school funding.155 Each of these cases generated 
some controversy, but none of them countered strongly held 
public views in the manner of the court’s capital punishment, 
criminal procedure, and busing decisions. 
 
 150 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1091: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON ABORTIONS. EVENLY DIVIDED ON MEDI-CAL ABORTIONS 
PAYMENTS 1–2 (Aug. 19, 1980). 
 151 Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971). 
 152 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1089: STRONG SUPPORT FOR 
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT. REAGAN’S FAILURE TO ENDORSE IT MIGHT ADVERSELY 
AFFECT HIS CHANCES IF PRESIDENTIAL RACE TIGHTENS 1, 3 (Aug. 12, 1980).  
 153  Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
 154  For text and analysis of Proposition 6 of 1978 (the “Briggs Initiative”), see CAL. 
SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 7, 1978, at 28–31 (1978). The measure was defeated 58.4–41.6%. See CAL. 
SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 7, 
1978 (1978). 
 155 Some argue that one additional rights-expanding decision from this era, Serrano 
v. Priest, produced indirect pushback from voters. Serrano created a state constitutional 
right to equalized school funding in and de-linked local property taxes from the funding of 
local public schools. Although citizens did not mobilize to overturn Serrano, they did 
overwhelmingly support Proposition 13 of 1978, which reduced property taxes and placed 
strict limits on future increases. Some analysts believe that voters supported Proposition 
13 at least in part because, as a result of the court’s ruling, their property taxes no longer 
directly supported their local schools. While this theory is plausible, polls do not confirm 
that the public made this connection and it cannot be said that Proposition 13 
“overturned” Serrano in the way that, for example, Proposition 17 overturned People 
v. Anderson. See DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY 60 (1998).  
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D.  Judicial Retention Elections and the Death of the Bird Court 
The tensions between the state supreme court and the 
electorate came to a head in 1986 when six of the court’s seven 
justices faced judicial retention elections. The six justices on the 
ballot that year were Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Cruz 
Reynoso, Justice Joseph Grodin, Justice Stanley Mosk, Justice 
Edward Panelli, and Justice Malcolm Lucas.156 By 1986, Chief 
Justice Bird had served on the court for nearly a decade, and had 
been a lightning rod for criticism the entire time.157 She narrowly 
won popular confirmation in 1978, receiving 52% of the vote, by 
far the lowest percentage any California Supreme Court justice 
had received in a confirmation or retention election since the 
system was established in 1934.158 After surviving that election, 
she remained a target. Opponents organized several efforts to 
recall her in 1981–1983, but each failed to qualify for the 
ballot.159 Thereafter, public opposition to Bird continued to 
spread, and in mid-1985, opponents, including district attorneys 
and correctional officers, launched a campaign to defeat her in 
the 1986 retention election.160 Between mid-1985 and the fall 
1986 election, Field conducted eight separate polls measuring 
public attitudes toward the chief justice. The polls consistently 
showed that a substantial majority of voters were determined to 
remove her from office. When asked why they wanted to remove 
Chief Justice Bird, respondents mentioned, in order of frequency, 
that they did not like her opposition to the death penalty; they 
considered her too lenient and soft on criminals; they believed 
she let killers go free; they did not like her positions and stands 
on the issues; they thought she had not upheld the will of the 
people or enforced the law; they concluded that she had not done 
a good job; and they considered her too liberal—followed by other 
criticisms.161 
 
 156 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 4, 1986, at 36–37 (1986). For Justice Grodin’s account of the 1986 judicial 
election, see GRODIN, supra note 96, at 169–81. 
 157 Barry Latzer, California’s Constitutional Counterrevolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS IN THE STATES 149, 166 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996). 
 158 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 156; GRODIN, supra note 96, at 
167–68. 
 159 See Complete List of Recall Attempts, CAL. SECRETARY ST. ALEX PADILLA, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/recalls/complete-list-recall-attempts/ [http://perma.cc/NK3 
K-LEP5]; see also Richard Bergholz, Effort to Recall Rose Bird Puts State GOP in a 
Quandary, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1982, at B3. 
 160 The Dolphin Group, a political campaign firm, managed the effort. In addition to 
law enforcement organizations, the campaign received support from business groups, 
agricultural interests, and the Republican Party. See Frank Clifford & John Balzar, 
2 Groups Join Forces in Seeking Bird’s Defeat, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at A20; see also 
GRODIN, supra note 96, at 169. 
 161 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1362: BY A FIVE TO THREE 
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Voters were angry at the chief justice and, to a lesser degree, 
other members of the court, for many reasons, but the divide 
between the people and the court on the issue of capital 
punishment was the single biggest irritant. Many voters thought 
they had settled the question of the legitimacy of the death 
penalty under the California Constitution in 1972, when they 
had reversed the court’s ruling in Anderson.162 But the 
controversy had persisted. After capital punishment was 
reinstated in California and juries had sentenced scores of 
convicted felons to death, the state supreme court had reversed 
nearly all of the sentences, often on technicalities. Several 
members of the court’s progressive wing had not fully accepted 
the voters’ verdict in overturning Anderson and affirming capital 
punishment. Rose Bird was the most resistant. During her 
tenure on the court, she participated in the review of sixty-one 
capital convictions, and voted to overturn the sentence in all 
sixty-one of them.163 Meanwhile, by 1986, voter support for 
capital punishment had spiked to 83%, with only 14% opposed—a 
remarkably broad consensus.164 The chief justice and the public 
were polarized on this emotional and high-profile issue. As 
opposition to Bird hardened, it was apparent that voters would 
remove her; it was less certain whether they would also reject 
one or more of her progressive colleagues. Veteran liberal justice 
Stanley Mosk escaped, but two other progressives, Cruz Reynoso 
and Joseph Grodin, were not so fortunate. On Election Day, 
voters defeated Bird, Reynoso, and Grodin—and thus, in one 
stroke, decimated the court’s progressive majority. 
Table 4: Results of 1986 California Supreme Court Elections165 
Justice Appointing Governor Outcome % Yes Vote 
Justice Malcolm Lucas George Deukmejian (R) Confirmed 80 
Justice Edward Panelli George Deukmejian (R) Confirmed 79 
Justice Stanley Mosk Pat Brown (D) Retained 74 
Justice Joseph Grodin Jerry Brown (D) Defeated 43 
Justice Cruz Reynoso Jerry Brown (D) Defeated 40 
Chief Justice Rose Bird Jerry Brown (D) Defeated   34 
 
MARGIN, VOTERS STILL OPPOSED TO RETAINING ROSE BIRD 2 (Oct. 9, 1986).  
 162 Dan Morain, Both Sides Point to Death Penalty Decision of 1972, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 1986, at A3. 
 163 Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once California’s Chief Justice, Is Dead at 63, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at B18. 
 164 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1353: STRONG OPPOSITION TO 
ROSE BIRD CONTINUES. CONFIRMATION OF ALL OTHER JUSTICES FAVORED 3 (Aug. 12, 
1986). 
 165 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, SUPPLEMENTAL VOTE COUNT STATISTICS 
CONCERNING THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 4, 1986 
(1986).  
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IV. AFTER THE FALL: THE LUCAS COURT 
The dismissal of Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso and 
Grodin, on November 4, 1986, produced three vacancies on the 
court. George Deukmejian, the long-time critic of the court’s 
jurisprudence, was elected to a second term as Governor the 
same day, and now had the opportunity to reconstitute the court 
in line with his vision of the California Constitution and the 
court’s proper role in the state’s constitutional design.  
George Deukmejian’s public career—as a state legislator, 
Attorney General, and Governor—spanned from 1963 to 1991, a 
period of intensifying public concern about crime and lenient 
courts. Of all elected officials in California during these years, he 
most consistently and effectively supported tough-on-crime 
measures and opposed the court’s progressive orientation, 
especially on criminal justice issues.166 While serving as Attorney 
General, Deukmejian publicly attacked what he considered to be 
the court’s excessive embrace of the new judicial federalism—
that is, its frequent use of independent state grounds to expand 
rights.167 When he ran for Governor, Deukmejian remarked that 
he was motivated to seek the office because the Governor, not the 
Attorney General, is the one who appoints judges.168 He wanted 
to appoint what he called “no-nonsense” judges, those who would 
show deference to the political branches, use self-restraint in 
exercising the power of judicial review, and not unnecessarily 
invoke the state constitution to expand rights.169 During his two 
terms as Governor (1983–1991), Deukmejian nominated more 
than 1000 judges, including eight members of the California 
Supreme Court: Malcolm Lucas (1984–1996, chief justice 
1987−1996); Edward A. Panelli (1985–1994); John A. Arguellas 
(1987–1989); David N. Eagleson (1987–1991); Marcus M. 
Kaufman (1987–1990); Joyce L. Kennard (1989–2014); Armand 
Arabian (1990–1996); and Marvin R. Baxter (1991–2015).170 
Governor Deukmejian’s nominees to the state’s highest court 
had several common characteristics. First, they were seasoned 
jurists. All of his nominees had served as lower court judges, and 
 
 166 Kenneth Ofgang, Personality Profile: George Deukmejian: East Coast Transplant 
Who Rose to Governorship Looks Back at Life of Service , METROPOLITAN 
NEWS-ENTERPRISE 3 (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.metnews.com/articles/2012/deuk0117 
12.htm [perma.cc/4QZF-FFWC]. 
 167 See, e.g., George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No 
Anchor—Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 
(1979). 
 168 Ofgang, supra note 166. 
 169 Daniel M. Weintraub & Jennifer Warren, Benchmarks: Governor Keeps Tight Rein 
on Who Will Become Judge, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1988, at AD1.  
 170 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9. 
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most had “gone through the chairs”—that is, served as both trial 
court judge and as justice on the state’s intermediate court of 
appeal before being elevated to the state supreme court. Second, 
they were generally moderate-conservatives; none was a 
“movement conservative” who would seek to launch an 
ideological counterrevolution from the right. Third, they were 
practitioners, not law professors or theoreticians. In short, their 
backgrounds and jurisprudential orientations made them less 
likely to embrace the new judicial federalism, and more likely to 
limit the court’s role in expanding new constitutional rights. 
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas, the 
court stabilized and repaired its legitimacy. At the same time, 
the court retained its national influence, as it continued to be 
highly cited by courts in other states.171 The Lucas years 
produced no deep conflicts between the court and the people and 
no organized efforts to remove justices. While the Lucas court 
was reticent to create new state constitutional rights, it also was 
generally careful not to overturn prior decisions establishing 
such rights.172 The court reversed some progressive precedents in 
the common law, especially in the area of tort, and upheld death 
sentences at much increased rates through modification of the 
harmless error rule.173 But the Lucas court did not undo, for 
example, prior rulings in state constitutional rights cases such as 
Serrano v. Priest II (1976),174 requiring school funding 
equalization, or Committee to Defend Reproductive 
Rights v. Myers (1981),175 requiring public funding for abortion. 
Moreover, the Lucas court handed down a decision in Raven v. 
Deukmejian (1990) that defended the core principle of the new 
judicial federalism, namely that state supreme courts should be 
able to interpret state constitutional rights independently of U.S. 
Supreme Court interpretation of federal constitutional rights.176 
As discussed above, in 1990 voters approved Proposition 115, the 
Crime Victims Justice Reform Act. That initiative contained 
several specific limitations on the rights of criminal defendants, 
as well as a “lock-step” provision, which provided that the 
California Constitution “shall not be construed by the courts to 
afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded 
 
 171 Dear & Jessen, supra note 8, at 701. 
 172 John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court: 1977-1997, 
61 ALB. L. REV. 1461, 1476–77 (1998). 
 173 J. Clark Kelso, A Tribute to Retiring Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, 27 PAC. L.J. 
1401 (1996). 
 174 Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977). 
 175 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981). 
 176 Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). 
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by the Constitution of the United States.”177 The court upheld the 
separate restrictions on defendant rights, but struck down the 
lock-step provision. In the court’s view, the lock-step rule would 
so restrict the power of the state judicial branch and so “severely 
limit[] the independent force and effect of the California 
Constitution” as to be a “revision” of the state constitution rather 
than an amendment, and therefore impermissible under the 
limits of the initiative process.178 The most conservative court in 
modern California history thus protected the core institutional 
principle of the new judicial federalism. 
V. THE GEORGE COURT: REVIVAL OF THE NEW JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM AND POPULAR PUSH-BACK 
In 1990, Republican Pete Wilson won election to replace 
George Deukmejian as Governor of California. Wilson was known 
as a moderate Republican, more liberal than Deukmejian on 
social issues, and prominently pro-choice on abortion. During his 
two terms as Governor (1991–1999), Wilson nominated four 
justices to the California Supreme Court: Ronald M. George 
(1991–2011, chief justice 1996–2011); Kathryn M. Werdegar 
(1994–present); Ming W. Chin (1996–present); and Janice Rogers 
Brown (1996–2005).179 Of the four, Janice Rogers Brown was 
considered the most conservative—a movement conservative. But 
the other three were more moderate. Collectively, Wilson’s 
appointees moved the court to more progressive positions on 
some issues and revived the court’s expansion of state 
constitutional rights in the areas of abortion, same-sex marriage, 
and gay rights beyond marriage.  
Table 5: New California State Constitutional Rights, Post-1986, 
and Overriding Amendments180 
Category 
New State 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Cases 
Establishing 
Rights 
Overriding 
Amendments 
Vote 
Abortion Right of minors 
to abortion 
without parental 
notification 
American 
Academy of 
Pediatrics v. 
Lungren (1997) 
Prop. 73 (2005) 
Prop. 85 (2006) 
Prop. 4 (2008) 
 
Fail (47.2–52.8%) 
Fail (45.8–54.2%) 
Fail (48.0–52.0%) 
 
 177 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 129. 
 178 Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086, 1088; see also John Dinan, Court-Constraining 
Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983, 1015–16 (2007). 
 179 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9. 
 180 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BRUCE MCPHERSON, STATEMENT OF VOTE: SPECIAL ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 8, 2005, at 3 (2005); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BRUCE MCPHERSON, STATEMENT OF 
VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 7, 2006, at 73 (2006); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA 
BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 59, 62 (2008). 
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Category 
New State 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Cases 
Establishing 
Rights 
Overriding 
Amendments 
Vote 
Marriage Right of same-sex 
couples to marry 
In re Marriage 
Cases (2008) 
Prop. 8 (2008) Pass (52.2–47.8%) 
Equal 
protection  
Strict scrutiny for 
laws that classify 
on basis of sexual 
orientation 
In re Marriage 
Cases (2008) 
— — 
A.  Abortion Rights  
The court signaled a shift in direction on abortion rights in 
1996–1997, shortly after Ronald George succeeded Malcolm 
Lucas as chief justice. The case in question concerned a 
Deukmejian-era statute requiring a pregnant minor to obtain the 
consent of her parents (or a judge) before obtaining an abortion. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) that such parental 
consent laws did not violate the U.S. Constitution, opponents of 
the California law challenged the statute on state constitutional 
grounds in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren.181 When 
the court first considered the Lungren case in 1996, it upheld the 
statute by a narrow four-to-three decision authored by Justice 
Mosk.182 But when Chief Justice Lucas retired, Governor Wilson 
nominated Ronald George to replace him and Ming Chin to 
replace George as associate justice. With these changes on the 
bench, the narrowly divided court reversed the outcome. The 
court granted rehearing in May 1996 and, in a new decision 
issued the following year, invalidated the parental consent law.183 
The new decision, authored by Chief Justice George, held that 
the California Constitution’s right to privacy included the right of 
a minor to terminate her pregnancy without parental consent—
thereby again expanding California’s state constitutional 
abortion rights beyond the federal baseline.184 Recognizing the 
potential backlash against the decision, George stated: “I thought 
it was important to decide the case the way it should be decided. 
And I assigned it to myself as a sign I would not be 
intimidated.”185  
 
 181 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). 
 182 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 912 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1996), vacated, 940 P.2d 
797 (Cal. 1997). 
 183 Lungren, 940 P.2d at 831. For a discussion of the court’s switch in the case, see 
Edward J. Erler, The California Supreme Court in the Culture Wars, in COURTS AND THE 
CULTURE WARS 139, 141–45 (Bradley C.S. Watson ed., 2002). 
 184 Lungren, 940 P.2d at 809–10, 813–14. 
 185 MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE #1852: CHIEF 
JUSTICE RONALD GEORGE’S RULING COULD AFFECT HIS CONFIRMATION CHANCES NEXT 
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Pro-life activists were outraged by the new Lungren decision 
and resolved to seek to defeat Chief Justice George and Associate 
Justice Chin in their upcoming confirmation elections, scheduled 
for November 1998.186 However, public opinion was much less 
hostile to the George court’s ruling on this issue than it had been 
to the court’s criminal justice jurisprudence during the 
Wright-Bird era. Polls indicated that the California electorate 
had complex views about abortion (related to the stage and 
circumstances of the pregnancy) but leaned heavily toward the 
pro-choice position. Although some polls indicated that the public 
supported the idea of a parental consent law, others showed that 
large majorities of Californians consistently favored abortion 
rights.187 Accordingly, while it was possible that voters might 
narrowly approve an initiative constitutional amendment to 
override the court’s decision in Lungren, it was unlikely that the 
public would mobilize to remove a justice who issued a pro-choice 
decision. Indeed, the movement to defeat Chief Justice George 
and Associate Justice Chin (who had tipped the balance in the 
case) gained little traction. At the 1998 election, voters confirmed 
Chin by a 69% popular majority, George by more than 75%. 
Table 6: Results of 1998 California Supreme Court  
Judicial Elections188 
Justice Appointing Governor Outcome % Yes Vote 
Justice Janice Rogers Brown Pete Wilson (R) Confirmed 75.91 
Chief Justice Ron George Pete Wilson (R) Confirmed 75.49 
Justice Stanley Mosk Pat Brown (D) Retained 70.51 
Justice Ming Chin Pete Wilson (R) Confirmed 69.26 
After the challenges to George and Chin foundered, activists 
turned to the initiative process to try to overturn the court’s 
Lungren decision through state constitutional amendment, not 
once, or twice, but three times: in 2005 (Proposition 73); 2006 
(Proposition 85); and 2008 (Proposition 4). California voters 
narrowly defeated the measures each time, demonstrating that 
the court’s decision in Lungren was closely enough aligned with 
the electorate’s views to avoid popular override.  
 
YEAR 4 (Sept. 4, 1997). 
 186 Id. at 1. 
 187 Id. at 4; see also MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE 
#1747: LARGE MAJORITY TAKES PRO-CHOICE POSITION ON ABORTION, DECLINE IN SUPPORT 
FOR MEDI-CAL ABORTION PAYMENTS 1 (Mar. 17, 1995); MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN 
FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE #1863: STRONG SUPPORT FOR AND INITIATIVE WHICH 
WOULD REQUIRE A MINOR OBTAINING PARENTAL CONSENT BEFORE HAVING AN ABORTION 
(Dec. 12, 1997). 
 188 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BILL JONES, STATE OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 
3, 1998 (1998). 
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B.  Same-Sex Marriage  
The George court is best known for its rulings on the 
contested question of same-sex marriage, especially its landmark 
decision in In re Marriage Cases (2008), establishing a state 
constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry.189 At the time 
the California Supreme Court considered the question, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had not yet held that same-sex couples had 
a federal constitutional right to marry. To the contrary, the Court 
had rejected such a claim in 1972, and had never squarely 
revisited the question.190 The Supreme Court had issued other 
decisions protecting the federal constitutional rights of gay and 
lesbian persons in decisions such as Romer v. Evans (1996)191 and 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003),192 but strategists for the gay rights 
movement believed that the Court was not yet prepared to issue 
a broad decision granting same-sex couples federal constitutional 
marriage rights, a decision that would require the Court to 
overturn existing marriage laws across the country.193 Instead, 
the movement pursued a “new judicial federalism strategy”—that 
is, it turned to state supreme courts in progressive states to 
declare that their state constitution protected the right of 
same-sex couples to marry.194 In the tradition of the new judicial 
federalism, this approach called upon state courts to expand 
rights beyond what was, at the time, the federal constitutional 
standard. 
The movement had a breakthrough in Massachusetts in 
2003 when the Supreme Judicial Court declared that the 
Massachusetts Constitution guaranteed the right of same-sex 
couples to marry. Advocates of same-sex marriage pursued 
similar rulings in other states, but with little initial success. The 
supreme courts of New York (2006),195 Washington (2006),196 and 
Maryland (2007)197 refused to recognize a state constitutional 
right of same-sex marriage. The New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that the state’s marriage laws violated the state constitution’s 
equal protection principles, but narrowly held that civil unions 
for same-sex partners was a sufficient remedy.198 As of 2008, 
 
 189 In re Marriage Cases, 83 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 190 See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 191 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 192 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 193 See generally William C. Duncan, Avoidance Strategy: Same-Sex Marriage 
Litigation and the Federal Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 29 (2006). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006). 
 196 Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006). 
 197 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007). 
 198 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
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Massachusetts remained the only state to recognize same-sex 
marriages. 
The battle then shifted to California. In 2007–2008, the 
California Supreme Court deliberated on the question through 
review of a group of six consolidated appeals titled In re Marriage 
Cases.199 The California litigation proceeded in the midst of 
shifting public opinion. In 2000, the state’s voters had approved a 
statutory initiative, Proposition 22, establishing that “only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California,” by a wide 61–39% majority.200 Table 7 demonstrates 
that over the next eight years public opinion in California moved 
toward greater acceptance of same-sex marriage, but remained 
sharply divided on the question. The combination of the state’s 
highly accessible system of initiative constitutional amendment, 
divided public opinion, and a mobilized conservative opposition to 
same-sex marriage meant that a decision by the court to 
establish a new state constitutional right of same-sex couples to 
marry would likely face a serious challenge. And, indeed, as the 
court was reviewing the case, conservative defenders of existing 
marriage laws were preparing an initiative to embed in the state 
constitution the principle, approved by voters eight years before, 
that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”201 The amendment was designed to 
override the court in the same way that, a generation before, 
voters had overturned the court’s decisions on capital 
punishment, criminal procedure, and busing. 
For nearly four decades, the Field Research Corporation has 
surveyed California voters’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage 
and has recorded a major shift in public attitudes in favor of 
marriage rights for same-sex couples. 
As Table 7 indicates, in early 2008, the California Supreme 
Court reasonably could have concluded that public opinion had 
moved far enough in California that the electorate would accept a 
landmark ruling granting marriage rights to same-sex couples. 
When the court issued its decision in Marriage Cases on May 15, 
2008, it put the question to the test. The proponents of the 
override measure qualified it for the November 2008 election 
under the ballot designation “Proposition 8.”  
 
 199 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 200 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BILL JONES, STATEMENT OF VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION, 
MARCH 7, 2000, at 50–53, 153–55 (2000). 
 201 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, 
CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 54 (2008). The 
amendment would become California Constitution article I, section 7.5. 
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Table 7: Public Opinion of Same-Sex Marriage in  
California, 1977–2013202 
Year % Approve % Disapprove % No Opinion 
1977 28 59 13 
1985 30 62 8 
1997 38 56 6 
2003 42 50 8 
2004 44 50 6 
2006 44 50 6 
May 2008  In re Marriage Cases 
May 2008 51 42 7 
2009 49 44 7 
2010 51 42 7 
2012 59 34 7 
2013 61 32 7 
 The campaign for and against the amendment was one of 
the most intense and expensive in state history. Both sides of the 
issue presented forceful arguments. Opponents of Proposition 8 
framed the issue largely in terms of rights and emphasized that 
the voters should not take away the rights of gay and lesbian 
couples, while proponents framed the issue in terms of popular 
sovereignty and argued that the people, not the court, should 
determine this fundamental social question.203 In the ballot 
pamphlet argument, the measure’s proponents directly targeted 
the court:  
   Proposition 8 is simple and straightforward. It contains the same 14 
words that were previously approved in 2000 by over 61% of 
California voters: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California.” 
   Because four activist judges in San Francisco wrongly overturned 
the people’s vote, we need to pass this measure as a constitutional 
amendment to RESTORE THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE as a 
man and a woman.204  
Despite the broad trend in public opinion in California 
toward acceptance of same-sex marriage the state’s voters 
approved Proposition 8, and thus overturned In re Marriage 
Cases, by a narrow 52–48% margin.205 Passage of the amendment 
 
 202  MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE #2443: RECORD 
MAJORITY OF CALIFORNIA VOTERS APPROVES OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 2 (Feb. 
28, 2013) [hereinafter RELEASE #2443]. 
 203 For a discussion of the competing arguments and spending in the Prop. 8 election, 
see Kenneth P. Miller, The Democratic Coalition’s Religious Divide: Why California Voters 
Supported Obama, but Not Same-Sex Marriage, REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ÉTUDES 
AMÉRICAINES 46–62 (2009). 
 204 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, supra note 201, at 56. 
 205 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION 
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produced new rounds of litigation in state and federal courts. The 
first case involved a state constitutional challenge to Proposition 
8 titled Strauss v. Horton (2009).206 The petitioners argued that it 
was impermissible to take away a fundamental state 
constitutional right through the initiative process because such 
an action amounted to a revision of the state constitution. By a 
six-to-one majority, however, the California Supreme Court 
rejected the claim and upheld a central principle of state 
constitutionalism—namely, that the people have the power to 
define state constitutional rights and can override the court’s 
definition of a state-level right.207 Immediately after the Strauss 
ruling, opponents of Proposition 8 filed a challenge in federal 
court.208 This move finally shifted from state to federal court the 
question of whether there is a constitutional right to same sex 
marriage. After extensive litigation, the federal courts struck 
down Proposition 8 on federal constitutional grounds and, later, 
all state laws that limited marriage to a union between a man 
and a woman.209  
 
NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 7 (2008). 
 206 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).  
 207 In Strauss, Chief Justice George noted:  
   Under the California Constitution, the constitutional guarantees afforded to 
individuals accused of criminal conduct are no less well established or 
fundamental than the constitutional rights of privacy and due process or the 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. As we have seen, in past years a 
majority of voters has adopted several state constitutional amendments—for 
example, the measure reinstating the death penalty, and the multitude of 
constitutional changes contained in the 1982 Proposition 8 and in Proposition 
115—that have diminished state constitutional rights of criminal defendants, 
as those rights had been interpreted in prior decisions of this court. Although a 
principal purpose of all constitutional provisions establishing individual rights 
is to serve as a counter-majoritarian check on potential actions that may be 
taken by the legislative or executive branches, our prior decisions—reviewed at 
length above—establish that the scope and substance of an existing state 
constitutional individual right, as interpreted by this court, may be modified 
and diminished by a change in the state Constitution itself, effectuated 
through a constitutional amendment approved by a majority of the electors 
acting pursuant to the initiative power. 
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 450 (internal citations omitted). 
 208 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 209 In Perry, a federal district judge declared that Proposition 8 violated the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of the appeal on 
the grounds that the proponents of the initiative lacked Article III standing to defend a 
citizen initiative where state officials refused to do so. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013). After the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Hollingsworth and, more 
importantly, in United States v. Windsor, federal courts around the country began issuing 
decisions in cases challenging state marriage laws. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). When the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
Court recognized a federal constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry, thus 
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As Table 7 indicates, during this period, public opinion 
continued to move toward acceptance of same-sex marriage to the 
point where it was likely that if the issue had been placed on the 
California ballot as early as 2010, and certainly by 2012, voters 
would have endorsed the right of same-sex couples to marry 
through the democratic process. According to an early 2013 Field 
Poll, California voters supported allowing same-sex couples to 
marry by a near two-to-one margin (61% to 32%).210 Accordingly, 
the California Supreme Court could have avoided popular 
override of its judgment if it had stayed its hand and allowed the 
people to resolve the question by democratic means.211  
C.  Gay Rights Beyond Marriage  
Proposition 8 left untouched an important feature of In re 
Marriage Cases, namely the court’s ruling that, henceforth in 
California, all classifications based on sexual orientation will be 
considered suspect and will be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny.212 This standard extends the state constitution’s equal 
protection guarantees for gays and lesbians beyond federal 
constitutional requirements. Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
has invoked federal equal protection principles to invalidate laws 
that draw distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation in cases 
such as Romer v. Evans213 and United States v. Windsor,214 the 
Court has never held that sexual orientation classifications are 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. In Marriage Cases, the 
 
foreclosing further state constitutional deliberation on the question. Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 210 RELEASE #2443, supra note 202, at 2.  
 211 In his dissenting opinion in In re Marriage Cases, Justice Marvin Baxter advanced 
this argument: 
Left to its own devices, the ordinary democratic process might well produce, ere 
long, a consensus among most Californians that the term ‘marriage’ should, in 
civil parlance, include the legal unions of same-sex partners.  
   But a bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of democratic 
change, now abruptly forestalls that process and substitutes, by judicial fiat, 
its own social policy views for those expressed by the People themselves.  
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 457 (Cal. 2008). 
 212 For establishment of the rule, see id. at 435–44. In Strauss, the court emphasized 
that the rule remains in place. Writing for the court, Chief Justice George declared:  
As we have seen, in the Marriage Cases the majority opinion held that sexual 
orientation constitutes a suspect classification for purposes of analysis under 
the state equal protection clause and that statutes according differential 
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to the strict scrutiny 
standard of review. These general state equal protection principles established 
in the Marriage Cases are unaffected by the new section added to the 
California Constitution by Proposition 8.  
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 411.  
 213 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 214 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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California Supreme Court declared that the California 
Constitution mandates such scrutiny. Although the people, 
through Proposition 8, overturned that case’s core holding that 
same-sex couples have a right to marry, they did not disturb the 
court’s broader ruling imposing strict scrutiny for distinctions 
based on sexual orientation.215 
The court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to sexual 
orientation cases parallels its 1971 decision in Sail’er Inn 
v. Kirby to extend strict scrutiny to gender classifications.216 And, 
just as the California electorate broadly supports gender 
equality, it also generally supports equal rights for gays and 
lesbians. Setting aside the specific controversy over the definition 
of marriage, there was no organized opposition to the court’s 
extension of strict scrutiny to classifications based on sexual 
orientation. 
In sum, the George court (1997–2011) can be characterized 
as relatively centrist in the arena of rights. Although it issued 
progressive, rights-expanding decisions in the areas of abortion 
and gay rights (and, thus, was less conservative than the Lucas 
court), it did not establish new rights with the same frequency as 
the Wright and Bird courts. The people overturned the George 
court’s rights decisions only once, narrowly, through Proposition 
8 of 2008, and never mounted an effective campaign to remove its 
members from the bench.  
VI. THE NEW COURT 
A.  Transition to a More Progressive Court  
When Chief Justice George announced his retirement in 
2010, Governor Schwarzenegger nominated as his replacement 
Tani Cantil-Sakauye, a respected state appellate judge generally 
considered to be a moderate-conservative.217 Upon Chief Justice 
Cantil-Sakauye’s selection, Republican governors had made 
sixteen of the last seventeen nominations to the court, including 
two nominations each of Malcolm Lucas and Ronald George. The 
only exception was Democratic Governor Gray Davis’ nomination 
of Justice Carlos Moreno in 2001. The long stretch of Republican 
nominees came to an end in 2010, however, with Democrat Jerry 
Brown’s election to a third term.  
 
 215 Strauss, 207 P.3d at 396. 
 216 See Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539 (Cal. 1971). 
 217 Maura Dolan, Gov. Chooses Moderate for Chief Justice, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/22/local/la-me-0722-chief-justice-20100722 [perma.cc/ 
M6CN-JWLX]. 
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Between 2011 and 2014, Brown nominated three new 
justices to the court—Goodwin Liu (2011–present), 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar (2015–present), and Leondra Kruger 
(2015–present).218 These new justices are progressive, 
academically oriented, and—by supreme court standards—young 
(all three were born in the 1970s). None had prior judicial 
experience before joining the court. Due to their elite academic 
credentials and youth some observers believe that each of them 
has the potential to be nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court.219  
The new generation of Brown justices does not yet constitute 
a majority of the court, but in the short term they can be 
expected to form coalitions with centrist colleagues, especially 
Justice Werdegar, on some issues.220 Moreover, future 
nominations by Jerry Brown or his successors may soon produce 
a progressive majority to rival the one that dominated the court 
in the 1970s and early 1980s.  
B.  Prospects for a Renewed New Judicial Federalism in California  
As the California Supreme Court enters a transition to a new 
era, the prospects for a revival of a 1970s-style new judicial 
federalism remains uncertain. Although the court has an 
opportunity to pursue that goal, it will face obstacles if it chooses 
to do so. 
First, it seems that the opportunity for revival of a 
progressive, rights-expanding jurisprudence is real. California’s 
ongoing partisan realignment should give Democrats control of 
the Governor’s office for the foreseeable future, and Democratic 
governors can be expected to create on the court a dominant 
left-leaning majority. If so, it is possible that the California’s high 
court will become substantially more progressive than the U.S. 
Supreme Court in its thinking about rights—thus creating the 
type of gaps between a state supreme court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court that fuels the new judicial federalism.  
Moreover, new theories of rights can be expected to emerge 
in the near term, creating fresh opportunities for the court to 
innovate by establishing new rights at the state level. While 
some potential new rights may now seem implausible or remote, 
others are knocking at the door.  
 
 218 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9. 
 219 See, e.g., Oren Kerr, The State Court Bench as SCOTUS Farm Team, WASH. 
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/23/the-state-court-bench-as-a-scotus-farm-team/ [http://per 
ma.cc/R KX8-T49U]. 
 220 See Gerald F. Uelmen & Kyle Graham, A Shifting Balance on the California 
Supreme Court?: A Look at the State Supreme Court’s Newest Justices, CAL. LAW., Sept. 2015. 
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One example is the asserted right to personal autonomy at 
the end of life. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Washington v. Glucksberg that the U.S. Constitution does not 
protect a right to physician-assisted suicide, or physician 
aid-in-dying.221 In recent years, a national movement has grown 
to establish that right on a state-by-state basis. California law 
long treated the aiding of suicide, by a physician or anyone else, 
as a felony. After a long struggle, in 2015 proponents of “death 
with dignity” persuaded the California Legislature to adopt, and 
Governor Brown to sign, A.B. 15, a bill that liberalizes the 
restrictions on physician aid-in-dying.222 The new law expands 
the ability of certainly terminally ill adults to receive physician 
assistance in terminating their lives, but includes various 
qualifications and restrictions that limit access and choice. As the 
movement for greater end-of-life autonomy gains force, advocates 
may argue that these types of limitations burden constitutional 
rights. In the same manner that the California Supreme Court 
held that the Legislature’s early adoption of liberalized abortion 
laws in the late 1960s failed to satisfy the constitutional 
requirements, so, too, could a progressive court rule that the 
state constitution demands greater personal autonomy for 
persons at the end of life than the Legislature has endorsed.223 
The issue of aid-in-dying has not yet reached the California 
Supreme Court, but it may eventually present the court’s 
progressive justices an opportunity to expand rights in this 
contested area.  
Advocates of other emerging claims in the areas of personal 
autonomy and equality can be expected to set their sights on 
California’s high court and encourage it to reassert its leadership 
in the expansion of the frontiers of rights. 
Such opportunities are matched by limiting factors. First is 
the legacy of the court-constraining amendments California 
voters enacted in response to Wright and Bird court decisions. 
While the new court may creatively expand state constitutional 
rights in some areas, in others, especially criminal law, it is 
 
 221 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 222 A.B. 15, 2015–2016 Leg. Sess., Spec. Sess. (Cal. 2015). For many years, California 
Penal Code section 401 read: “Every person who deliberately aids, or advises, or 
encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 
2015). In 1992, proponents of physician-assisted suicide qualified Proposition 161, known 
as the “Aid-in-Dying Act” for the California statewide ballot. The measure failed on a vote 
of 46% yes to 54% no. California Proposition 161, the Aid-in-Dying Act (1992), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_161,_the_Aid-in-Dying_Act_ 
(1992) [http://perma.cc/5NVE-MS4B]. Attempts to pass a similar law through the 
Legislature also failed until 2015. 
 223 See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 276 (Cal. 1972). 
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constrained by the restrictions the people placed in the state 
constitution decades ago. A second potential limiting factor is the 
Legislature. Today, the California Legislature is one of the most 
progressive lawmaking bodies in the nation and is less likely 
than its predecessors to take a back seat to the court in pursuing 
a progressive vision of equality and personal autonomy. As the 
aid-in-dying bill shows, rights activists can choose to go to the 
Legislature to achieve their aims, and an ambitious court might 
find itself competing with the political branches for leadership in 
the expansion of rights. A third potential limiting factor is the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The new judicial federalism has flourished 
where state supreme courts are more progressive than the U.S. 
Supreme Court and have expanded rights beyond where the U.S. 
Supreme Court is willing to go. If new progressive justices cause 
the U.S. Supreme Court to begin aggressively expanding federal 
constitutional rights, that Court will dominate the field and 
create fewer opportunities for the California Supreme Court, or 
other state supreme courts, to assert leadership. 
Finally, it is uncertain how the California electorate would 
respond to a revival of the new judicial federalism. During the 
Wright-Bird era, the electorate accepted some of the court’s 
rights-expanding decisions, but overwhelmingly repudiated the 
court’s jurisprudence in the areas of criminal law and mandatory 
desegregation. The electorate of the 1970s and 1980s was 
considerably more conservative than the court on these issues, 
and that chasm between their respective values led the public to 
adopt court-constraining amendments and, eventually, to remove 
three progressive justices. Today, the California electorate is 
more liberal than it was then and thus, in theory, should be more 
inclined to embrace new rights-expanding decisions in a range of 
areas. How the public would actually respond remains to be 
tested.  
CONCLUSION 
 The new judicial federalism flourished in California 
during the 1970s and 1980s as the state supreme court became 
the national leader in expanding state constitutional rights 
beyond federal minimums. Many of those rights remain in place 
today. Yet, in its enthusiasm to align California’s constitutional 
law with the values of modern liberalism, the court distanced 
itself too far from the public’s deeply held convictions in certain 
areas, including busing, capital punishment, and criminal 
procedure. In those cases, the court’s pursuit of a highly 
counter-majoritarian progressive agenda was unsustainable—it 
resulted in the wholesale reversal of decisions through state 
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constitutional amendments, the removal of most of the court’s 
progressive members, and their replacement with a new 
conservative majority. 
Since the crisis of the 1986 election, the California Supreme 
Court has been more cautious in its approach to the new judicial 
federalism. While in the post-Bird era the court defended the 
concept of independent state constitutionalism, it showed 
restraint in exercising that power. This self-restraint helped 
produce a period of stability on the court, with few attempted 
court-constraining amendments and no serious challenges to the 
justices in retention elections.  
The state has now entered an era in which Democratic 
governors can be expected to nominate progressive justices for 
the foreseeable future. As a new progressive majority emerges, it 
has the opportunity to revive the court’s leadership in 
establishing new rights. The prospect undoubtedly has appeal. 
State supreme courts receive respect and affirmation from the 
community of progressive legal academics and practitioners by 
expanding the frontier of rights through expansive 
interpretations of state constitutions. Moreover, as social change 
creates new conceptions of rights, the court will have many 
invitations to innovate.  
If it seeks to expand rights, however, the new court will face 
some limitations, including potential opposition from the 
contemporary electorate. As the experience of the past several 
decades demonstrates, the California Constitution gives the 
people, not the court, the last word on the definition of contested 
state constitutional rights. While this majoritarian check may 
limit the new court’s ability to expand rights, it will also provide 
greater legitimacy to any new state constitutional rights the 
court establishes and the people accept. The California 
electorate’s increasingly progressive orientation means that it is 
now more likely to embrace rights-expanding decisions, at least 
on some issues, than voters were a generation ago. But when 
contemplating their future course, the new justices cannot forget 
the fate of the Bird court, which will always serve as a cautionary 
reminder that the California Constitution’s majoritarian features 
limit how far an ambitious court can veer from the popular will. 
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